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PPB No.46  2/18/99  2:57 PM  Page 3“Self-reliance” has become a concept central to U.S. domestic policy in
recent years. It is widely believed that past government policies have
made the poor dependent on government assistance and the solution is
to move people into paid labor. The bipartisan support for the welfare
reform legislation of 1996 is evidence that both parties are committed to
the goal of self-reliance. But will welfare reform achieve this goal? It is
easy to remove people from the welfare rolls, but it may be difficult for
f o rmer beneficiaries to obtain employment and more difficult still for
them to find jobs that pay enough to lift their families out of poverty.
The United States now has a policy that attempts to make people more
self-reliant, but it does not measure their ability to achieve self-reliance.
The official poverty measure counts the number of people with an
income below a stated poverty line, but makes no attempt to measure
their ability to escape poverty through their own eff o rts. Researc h
Associate Robert Haveman and Andrew Bershadker, both of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, propose such a measure. They define
“net earnings capacity (NEC)” as the income a family would earn if all
adults in that family worked full-time, full-year. To arrive at an NEC,
they estimate what each individual in the family could earn by compar-
ing him or her to an individual with similar human capital who works
full-time, full-year; they total the individuals’ potential earnings; and
then they subtract the cost of child care. They compare the net earnings
capacity to the poverty line to obtain an estimate of the number of peo-
ple who are incapable of raising themselves out of poverty on their own.
Haveman and Bershadker’s findings are distressing to anyone who
believes work alone can cure povert y. Between 1993 and 1995 the
5 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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annual average official poverty rate was 13.72 percent and the NEC
poverty rate was 10.54 percent. Subtracting the NEC rate from the offi-
cial rate yields a diff e rence of 3.18 percentage points, or 23 perc e n t ,
which can be interpreted as meaning that the poverty rate would decline
only 23 percent if every adult in every family currently in poverty found
a job and worked at full capacity. 
Stated another way, three-fourths of those living in poverty today would
not succeed in pulling themselves out of poverty even if they obtained
full-time employment. One reason for this is that many of the poor can
obtain only jobs with such low wages that even if they work at their full
capacity, their income will remain below the poverty line. Another rea-
son is that many of the poor are single parents and necessary child care
expenses reduce their net income below the poverty line. Moreover, if
e v e ry adult who currently is voluntarily out of the labor force were to
enter the labor market in an attempt to reach his or her earnings capac-
ity, the economy might not be able to absorb all of these workers. Many
might not be able to find work and those who did might bid down wages
of those who were already employed at or near the poverty level.
Haveman and Bershadker’s findings that NEC poverty has risen signifi-
cantly since the mid 1970s (a period during which the official poverty
rate rose only slightly) raise difficult questions for public policy. If a goal
of government policy is self-reliance, should that policy ensure that all
individuals are able to achieve self-reliance? This could be accomplished
by raising the skills of workers and increasing the returns to work. Policy
options thus become improving the quality of education for those at the
bottom of the income scale, increasing the minimum wage, expanding
the earned income tax credit, introducing a negative income tax, paying
child care expenses, expanding government employment programs, or
some combination of these.
How we define poverty will necessarily determine what we believe we
should do to ameliorate it. Haveman and Bershadker’s alternative con-
cept of poverty gives us a new perspective for evaluating policy
approaches. I welcome your comments on their work.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Executive Director
November 1998
PPB No.46  2/18/99  2:57 PM  Page 67 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
In the current political and social climate, with its call for self-reliance
as the means by which families and individuals should support them-
selves, the official U.S. poverty indicator may be measuring the size of a
population that is of less interest to policymakers than in past years. We
p resent here an alternative measure of poverty for the United States
population that is based on a family’s capacity for generating income rather
than its actual money income. This measure, called net earnings capacity
(NEC), rests on a concept of self-reliance and is used to determine the
size of the population that is unable to be self-reliant.
In this brief, we discuss diff e rent concepts of “poverty” and the curre n t
o fficial poverty measure. We describe the conceptual basis for NEC
p o v e rty with an overview of the mechanics of calculating the measure
and compare trends in NEC poverty to trends in the official poverty mea-
s u re. We then ask what underlying factors in the U.S. economy could
account for the observed trends in NEC poverty and their diff e rence fro m
t rends in official povert y. Finally, we offer some policy implications.
The Concept of Poverty and How We Measure it
Nearly all developed countries accept the social goal of reducing or elim-
inating “poverty” among their citizens. However, there is no commonly
accepted measure of poverty among poverty analysts, re s e a rchers, and
policymakers from nation to nation or even within any one country, so
t h e re is no easy way to determine which countries have more or less
poverty or who should be counted among the poor.
Self-reliance and Poverty 
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R e s e a rchers with a sociological perspective often advocate a multi-
dimensional concept of povert y, one that reflects many aspects of every d a y
life. For example, they look at people who are deprived of social contacts
with friends and families and refer to a degree of “social isolation povert y ”
relative to some norm of contact. People living in squalid housing are
viewed as “housing poor” and people with health deficits as “health poor.” 
Economists, of course, tend to prefer a measure that somehow re f l e c t s
economic well-being. However, even among economists, there is dis-
a g reement about how best to measure such well-being. Some compare
the income of a family to some minimum standard of income, which
they label the poverty line. Others look to consumption as an indicator
of economic well-being. Still others rely on families’ own assessment of
their economic well-being to make a judgment regarding who is poor.1
The United States was one of the first countries to establish an official
definition of povert y, and the definition, developed over 30 years ago,
has remained largely unchanged. Based on an economist’s concept of
“income povert y,” comparing cash income to an assessment of income
needs, it has been used to track the nation’s poverty rate and the charac-
teristics of people identified as poor over time (see Fisher 1992).
The official measure identifies poor families and the individuals living in
them by comparing two numbers: the current annual cash income of the
family unit and an estimate of the income necessary for a family of a partic -
ular size and composition to meet a minimum level of consumption. This sec-
ond number is the family’s “poverty threshold” or “poverty line.” If the
income of the family does not exceed its poverty line, the family is
defined as “poor.” The nation’s “poverty rate” is the percentage of its
population who live in poor families, so defined.2
Figure 1 shows the official poverty rate for the United States from 1959
to 1996. From 1959 to 1969 the rate dropped sharply. After a slight rise
in the late 1960s, it reached its all-time low in 1973, when it stood at
11.1 percent. At that time roughly 23 million people were poor, 42 per-
cent less than in 1959. The rate oscillated between 11 and 12 percent
from 1973 to 1979 and then increased steadily until it reached 15.2 per-
cent in 1983. Over the next 10 years the rate first fell and then climbed
to close to the 1983 level. In the period of job growth from 1993 to
PPB No.46  2/18/99  2:57 PM  Page 81996, the proportion and number of the poor have declined, from a high
of 15.1 percent (39.3 million persons)in 1993 to about 13.7 perc e n t
(36.5 million person) in 1996.
Figure 1 Official Poverty Rate, All Individuals, 1959 to 1996
S o u rc e: U.S. Bureau of the Census, M a rch Current Population Surv ey ( Wa s h i n g t o n ,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975–1996).
The Relevance of the Official Poverty 
M e a s u re to Policy To d a y
Although the official measure of poverty is open to many criticisms, both
conceptual and practical, it is widely used as an indicator of how the
nation is doing in combating povert y. Because most of the measure m e n t
p roblems are relatively constant over time, analysts and policymakers feel
confident in using the official measure to assess changes in the level of
p o v e rty in the country and the country ’s success in assuring a minimum
level of living for its citizens. Eff o rts are being made to correct some of its
most important pro b l e m s .3
H o w e v e r, one important reason to be dissatisfied with the official measure
is that it does not measure permanent characteristics of a family; it re l i e s
on a single year of cash income of a family, while for many families
annual income fluctuates. Unemployment, layoffs, the decision to under-
take mid-career training or to change jobs, health considerations, and
Net Earnings Capacity versus Income for Measuring Povert y
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especially income flows from self-employment may all cause the money
income of a household to change substantially from one year to the next.
In recent years some policymakers, reflecting the changing sentiments of
many citizens, have called into question the basic concept on which the
o fficial measure rests and the policy approaches that follow from it.
What the rate measures, so the discussion goes, is how short of income
families are (in any given year) and the policy that follows from that
m e a s u re is to supplement income through welfare and other transfers.
However, it is argued, government income support has created a dysfunc-
tional social class that generates more poverty because people become
dependent on that support. In this view, having some people with low
cash income is not the fundamental problem; rather the problem is hav-
ing a number of people who are not self-reliant.4 This view is consistent
with the trend in political rhetoric calling for a smaller economic and
social policy role for government.
A growing emphasis and insistence on “self-reliance” and “economic
independence” in social policy can be seen in the 1996 welfare reform
legislation. The provision setting up block grants to the states, titled
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), eliminates the enti-
tlement status of the receipt of public transfer benefits by single-parent
households and imposes firm limits on the period for which eligible fami-
lies can receive support. The message to single parents, irrespective of
their skills, training, or home demands, is that they have to “get by on
their own.”
The emphasis on self-reliance can also be seen in proposals for the priva-
tization of Social Security. Plans involve assigning some portion of the
contributions made on behalf of working-age individuals directly to
them, with the requirement that they manage these financial resources
themselves (with some constraints) and then make do in their re t i re-
ment years with the assets they accumulate in these private accounts.
How they get by in their older years would reflect the choices and sav-
ings efforts they made during their working years. Other manifestations
of this emphasis on supplanting public support with self-reliance are 
p roposals for medical savings accounts as a replacement for Medicare
benefits, tighter eligibility criteria for disabled childre n ’s receipt of
Supplemental Security Income benefits, the elimination of most legal
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immigrants from eligibility for public income support, the shift fro m
defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans, and the shift from
grants to loans to cover the rising costs of higher education.
In part because of the stridency of this movement, the official measure of
p o v e rty appears to have become less relevant in policy discussions in re c e n t
years and less attended to by policymakers. Indeed, to advocates of policy
p roposals emphasizing self-reliance, the official measure is but an indicator
of failed social policy based on communitarian objectives. According to
this view, basing policy on a poverty measure that rests on income re a l i z a-
tions can only mean that public support must always increase in order to
compensate for the decrease in individual eff o rt it cre a t e s .
An Alternative Poverty Concept and Measure: 
Net Earnings Capacity Poverty
Given the judgment that people need to rely on their own energies and
re s o u rces, it is interesting to ask the following reality-check questions:
What if there are people who do not have the capability to make it on
their own in our market society? What collective responsibility does the
nation have to them? At one extreme, some argue (as Charles Murray
has) that the nation should simply get the self-reliance message out and
let private charities provide whatever they wish to those families that are
unable to be self-reliant. Government should get out of the business of
trying to help the least able families and presume that people will some-
how make it on their own. This position is a harsh one, and perh a p s
more harsh than some advocates of the self-reliance position might be
comfortable with.
Another option for advocates of self-reliance is to consider what can be
done to increase the ability of people who are now unable to be econom-
ically self-reliant to become so. This option involves recasting the issue
of poverty, not making it vanish. The issue becomes how can public pol-
icy cope with a population unable to be self-reliant, what instru m e n t s
are available, and which are the most cost-effective.
What sort of poverty measure might be relevant to those who place pri-
mary emphasis on self-reliance as a social objective? In this policy brief,
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we put forth one answer to this question and draw out its policy implica-
tions. No measure consistent with this concern now exists. If one were
to design such a poverty measure, the objective would be to identify the
size and composition of the population who cannot be self-reliant and
the patterns of change in the size and composition of this population.
We propose a measure of self-reliance that reflects a family’s ability to
achieve economic independence on its own, that is, to attain a mini-
mum level of living through the use of its own capabilities.
In order to develop such a measure we need to establish certain conven-
tions, norms, and assumptions because there are no purely objective cri-
teria by which self-reliance or even capabilities can be defined. First, we
limit the applicability of the measure to people who live in families that
are headed by a working-age person (age 18 to 65). This makes sense as
the call for self-reliance is directed to people who should, through their
own work and efforts, be independent; few people today would want to
apply this standard to the elderly.
Second, we need to find a way to identify the “capabilities” of people in
such families, as any determination of the ability to be self-re l i a n t
requires some assessment of the resources that people can use to “make it
on their own.” We do this by calculating “earnings capacity”—essen-
t i a l l y, how much adults, given their capabilities and characteristics,
would be able to earn in the labor market if they were to work full-time,
f u l l - y e a r. We adopted this norm of work time for the purpose of this
study because it is generally accepted as the standard for being “fully
employed.” We emphasize that this measure of earnings capacity is an
indicator of capabilities or potential and carries no suggestion that every-
one age 18 to 65 should work full-time, full-year or that anyone who does
not work that much is somehow a “slacker.”5
Multivariate statistical techniques enable us to predict what each 
working-age adult in a representative sample of the population would be
able to earn if he or she worked full-time, full-year.6 This imputation is
based on observations of the actual earnings of full-time, full-year work-
ers with various characteristics of education, age, race, and so on. In
effect, the exercise here is to match each working adult who is not fully
employed with a close-to-identical person who is. The earnings of the
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full-time, full-year worker serve as the basis for predicting how much the
matching adult could earn if he or she were working at full capacity.7
In making this prediction for each working-age adult, we implicitly adopt
another assumption, namely, that people who do not work full-time, full-
year are doing so voluntarily, that is, they are not forced or constrained to
not work at full capacity. Such constraints certainly do exist. Cert a i n
characteristics (for example, having a disability or lacking an education)
may hinder individuals’ job-finding or job-holding ability, thus pre v e n t-
ing them from working at the full-time, full-year norm. Although it is not
possible to reflect these constraints with total accuracy, we developed a
statistical adjustment pro c e d u re that utilizes information in our database
to make an estimate of the extent to which these constraints, in a steady-
state world, tend to draw down earnings capacity.8
Having estimated the adjusted earnings capacity for each working-age
adult, we add the earnings capacities of all of the adults in a family unit
and then add to this subtotal the income the family receives from real
property (for example, rent, interest, dividends) to obtain the earnings
capacity for the family.9 We call this gross earnings capacity (GEC).
The GEC is an estimate of the capability of the family to generate earn-
ings if all its working-age members work at full capacity. However, it is a
defective estimate of the family’s ability to be self-reliant because it does
not take into account necessary work-related expenses. Adults incur
costs (which may be substantial) related to realizing their full earnings
c a p a c i t y. The most important of these for families with children are
those necessary to provide adequate care for their children.10 To reflect
those costs, we subtract from the family’s GEC the amount required to
purchase acceptable child care.11 This gives us the family’s net earnings
capacity (NEC), the value of the stream of services that could be yielded
by the family’s human capital.
In a final step, we compare the family’s NEC to the official (family-size
specific) poverty line for the family. This line, you will recall, is inter-
preted as the amount of income that would enable a family of a specific
size and composition to meet a minimum level of consumption. If the
NEC for a family is above this line, we classify the family as “able to be
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self-reliant,” or nonpoor in NEC terms. Families who do not have the
capacity to generate a net income stream in excess of their poverty line
are classified as “unable to be self-reliant” or NEC poor.
As we emphasized above, many conventions, norms, and assumptions
have gone into this NEC poverty measure. To review the main ones:
n Net earnings capacity is an indicator of the capability of a family to
generate an income stream that could be used for meeting needs. It
reflects the full-capacity (full-time, full-year) earnings capability of a
family and hence is a good index of the family’s ability to generate
income.
n Full-time, full-year work is assumed to be the working time of people
who are fully using their human capital. Values greater or less than
this amount could be used, but we accept this as a socially determined
norm of full employment.
n Adjustments are made for illness, disability, and other characteristics
related to long-run unemployability and reduced earnings capacity in
order to obtain a more realistic estimate of the potential value of an
individual’s human capital.12
n Child care costs associated with full-capacity work are subtracted from
the gross earnings capacity (GEC) to arrive at an estimate of a fam-
ily’s net earnings capacity (NEC).
n A family with an NEC below the official poverty line is defined as liv-
ing in NEC poverty. A family with an NEC above the poverty line is
considered to be capable of being self-reliant.
NEC Poverty and Official Poverty for U.S. Population
We use annual data from the March Current Population Survey to esti-
mate the rate of NEC poverty for families headed by a working-age per-
son in the United States from 1975 to 1995. The March Curre n t
Population Survey is an annual survey of over 50,000 American families,
obtaining detailed information on family stru c t u re and the income, labor
market activities, and labor market outcomes of the adults in the family.
It is a stratified random sample, so that using the appropriate weighting
factors (provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census) yields a picture of
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population. We also calculate poverty in the United States using the off i-
cial definition and concepts of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Our esti-
mates of the overall prevalence of both NEC poverty and official povert y
for 1975 to 1995  are shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2.1 3
While the official poverty rate over the period ranged from about 10 to 14
p e rcent, the NEC poverty rate ranged from about 6 to 11 percent. The pri-
m a ry factors that account for this diff e rence are (1) the counting of trans-
fer income (done in the official measure but not in the NEC measure), (2)
the less than full-time, full-year work of many working-age adults (which
a ffects the official poverty measure), and (3) the adjustment for child care
costs (which affects NEC poverty but not official povert y ) .
Figure 2 also shows the greater cyclical sensitivity of the official poverty
rate than the NEC poverty rate. While the official poverty rate ro s e
nearly 40 percent during the recession of the early 1980s, the NEC
p o v e rty rate rose less than half of this amount. Given that the NEC
m e a s u re reflects longer- t e rm (or permanent) earnings potential as
opposed to the shorter-term actual income amount reflected in the offi-
cial measure, the closer tie between current labor market conditions and
the official poverty rate is expected.
Net Earnings Capacity versus Income for Measuring Povert y
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Figure 2 NEC and Official Poverty Rates, Individuals in Households










Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, March Current Population Survey data files.
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All 5.79 10.54 3.38
Race of head
White 3.55 6.50 3.41
Black 17.72 24.34 1.78
Hispanic 12.67 19.66 2.47
Other 4.52 9.57 4.26
Sex of head
Male 2.84 5.77 4.02
Female 22.14 20.55 –0.41
Education of head
Less than high  
school graduate 12.58 28.22 4.59 
High school graduate 4.20 11.87 5.94
Some college 2.23 7.16 6.68
College graduate 0.47 1.22 5.46
Families with no children
All 4.43 7.18 2.71
Married couples 1.93 3.62 3.55 
Single men 8.76 11.08 1.31 
Single women 9.56 11.81 1.18 
Families with children
All 6.37 12.44 3.79 
Married couples 2.53 5.06 3.93
Single fathers 10.97 22.39 4.04
Single mothers 29.34 38.08 1.46
White 20.23 27.23 1.67
Black 39.08  46.72 1.00
Hispanic 40.86 48.10 0.91
Other 32.63 36.26 0.59
Single mothers on
welfare 44.98 58.73 1.49
Single mothers not
on welfare 17.72 26.16 2.19
Note: The growth rate is calculated using the average 1975–1977 and 1993–1995 poverty
rates and assuming 18 years of growth.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, March Current Population survey data files.
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All 10.19  13.72  1.67
Race of head
White 6.67  8.28  1.21
Black 27.94  29.45  0.29
Hispanic 21.88  27.74  1.33
Other 13.64  16.66  1.12
Sex of head
Male 5.94  7.89  1.59
Female 33.74  26.05  –1.43
Education of head
Less than high 
school graduate 20.13  35.61  3.22
High school graduate 7.66  14.82  3.73
Some college 5.63  9.39  2.88
College graduate 2.29  3.09  1.67
Families with no children
All 7.05  9.17  1.47
Married couples 2.70  3.12  0.80
Single men 12.94  15.17  0.89
Single women 17.32  17.66  0.11
Families with children
All 11.55  16.31  1.94
Married couples 6.37  8.38  1.54
Single fathers 11.00  19.42  3.21
Single mothers 43.15  45.16  0.25
White 31.35  32.58  0.21
Black 56.71  55.22  –0.15
Hispanic 55.03  57.37  0.23
Other 40.89  40.03  –0.12
Single mothers on 
welfare 68.88  77.19  0.63
Single mothers 
not on welfare 24.05  26.59  0.56
Note: The growth rate is calculated using the average 1975–1977 and 1993–1995 poverty
rates and assuming 18 years of growth.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, March Current Population survey data files.
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rate than has official povert y. Over the 1975 to 1995 period the pre v a l e n c e
of official poverty grew by about one-third, with an average annual gro w t h
rate of 1.7 percent. In contrast, the NEC poverty rate at the end of the
p e r i od is nearly 185 percent of its initial level, with an annual growth rate
of 3.4 percent, or twice the growth rate of the official povert y.
In our calculations, then, both the official poverty rate and the NEC
p o v e rty rate rose between 1975 and 1995. This growth in economic
inadequacy in terms of both current income and earnings potential is
t roubling when one considers the growth in affluence in the United
States; inflation-adjusted disposable income per capita has incre a s e d
from $13,400 to $18,900 (1992 dollars) over the 1975 to 1995 period, an
increase of over 40 percent. 
Our findings of growth in the poverty rate, it should be noted, run counter
to those of some other studies, in which the trend in aggregate poverty is
negative. Perhaps the most prominent of these is Slesnick (1993), who
bases his poverty measure on consumption expenditures as an indicator of
well-being. As we do, Slesnick compares his measure of economic position
to a set of poverty thresholds. However, while we have accepted the off i-
cial family-size-specific poverty thresholds, Slesnick computes an altern a-
tive set, and his thresholds have been strongly criticized.1 4
A second study that finds a downward trend in the poverty rate is that
by Jencks and Mayer (1996), who calculate a poverty rate for children
using a price index reflecting smaller price level increases than the offi-
cial index and a definition of family income that includes the income of
nonrelatives in the living unit and the value of public in-kind benefits.15
The rapid increase in the NEC poverty rate over the 1975 to 1995
period and the slower increase in the official poverty rate contrast starkly
with the decreases in the rate in the Slesnick and Jencks and Mayer
studies. The primary reason for these diff e rent patterns is clear. While
the NEC measure reflects the p o t e n t i a l of a family to generate income,
the other indicators seek to reveal income or consumption realizations.
The rise in the NEC poverty rate indicates a decline in the potential 
of families to generate income. The rise in the official poverty rate 
indicates a fall in realized income. The decline in the Slesnick and
S e l f - reliance and Povert y
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Jencks and Mayer poverty rates indicates a rise in consumption. Taken
together, these rates suggest that the earning potential of some families is
declining at the same time the realization of that declining potential is
rising. The fall or slower rise in realized income or consumption poverty
rates relative to the more rapid increase in the self-reliance poverty rate
suggests an upward trend in the extent to which families with the lowest
productive capabilities are in fact using these capabilities.
NEC and Official Poverty for Specific Subgroups 
of U.S. Population
The overall poverty trends that are described in Figure 2 hide a variety
of patterns of poverty growth among subgroups of the U.S. population.
For example, the growth in NEC poverty among the population sub-
groups shown in Table 1 ranges from –0.4 percent per year (for individu-
als living in families headed by a female) to over 6.6 percent per year
(for individuals living in families headed by a person with some college
education). The family types with the highest rates of growth of poverty
have experienced the largest losses in the capacity to escape povert y
t h rough their own work and earnings over the past two decades. The
s u b g roups in Table 1 with NEC poverty growth rates in excess of the
national average (3.4 percent per year) are:16
Average Annual NEC Poverty
Growth in NEC  Rate in 1995
Head of Household Poverty (percent) (percent)
White +3.41 6.50
Male  +4.02 5.77
Less than high 
school graduate +4.59 28.22
High school graduate +5.94 11.87
Married couple with 
no children +3.55 3.62
Married couple with 
children +3.93 5.06
From this list it is clear that the population subgroups experiencing the
most rapid growth in NEC poverty include families headed by whites,
males, and couples. Such families are not generally thought of as being
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though families headed by whites, males, and couples had large relative
i n c reases in NEC povert y, in 1995 the poverty rates for most of these
groups were still low relative to the overall 10.5 percent national rate.17
The most surprising story in Table 1 concerns the groups that have experi-
enced the lowest growth in NEC poverty over the period. The trends for
these groups are well below the overall 3.4 percent growth rate in NEC
p o v e rty or are negative. These low-growth groups tend to be those with
the highest overall levels of both NEC and official povert y. The subgro u p s
with the lowest trends in the NEC poverty index from 1975 to 1995 are :
Average Annual NEC Poverty
Growth in NEC Rate in1995
Head of Household Poverty (percent) (percent)
Black +1.78 24.34
Hispanic +2.47 19.66
Female – 0.41 20.55
Black single mother +1.00 46.72
Hispanic single mother +0.91 48.10
The rates show that a large percentage of individuals in black, Hispanic,
and mother-only families are unable to be self-reliant. Among these
groups, the NEC poverty rate in 1995 ranged from 19.7 percent to over
48 percent, compared to an overall NEC poverty rate of 10.5 percent.18
H o w e v e r, these same least well-off and most vulnerable groups experi-
enced either decreases or below average growth in NEC poverty. Among
these groups, the annual growth ranged from –0.41 percent to 2.47 per-
cent, compared to the overall NEC annual growth rate of 3.4 percent.
Factors Underlying Trends in NEC and Official 
P o v e rty Rates
We have encountered several trends in NEC poverty and official poverty
m e a s u res with interesting implications. The economic, demographic,
and cultural factors that underlie these patterns are numerous and inter-
act in complex, sometimes puzzling ways. For example, in spite of the
rapid growth of NEC poverty overall, groups commonly thought of as
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headed by a person with a low level of schooling—re c o rded below-
average increases in NEC (and to some extent, official) povert y, and
i n c reases that are less than the increases re c o rded for less vulnerable
g roups—whites, couples, and families headed by a person with a re l a-
tively high level of schooling.
What factors could have contributed to some of these patterns? The cat-
alogue of possibilities is large. Indeed, any change that affects the struc-
ture of work opportunities available in the economy (the demand side of
the labor market), people’s choices in response to these opport u n i t i e s
(the supply side of the labor market), or the demographic stru c t u re of
the population will likely have diff e rent effects on the prevalence and
trend of official poverty and poverty defined as the inability to be self-
reliant. Although it is impossible to assign responsibility for the observed
changes in either of these poverty measures to individual factors, it is
possible to identify the most important of the underlying changes and to
indicate their likely effects on these patterns. In the following para-
graphs, we summarize some of these factors.19
D e c reasing Female Povert y, Increasing Male Povert y
As we have seen, although both the official and NEC poverty rates for
members of female-headed families exceed those for members of male-
headed families, the male poverty rate has risen while the female povert y
rate has fallen.2 0 The primary factors that are likely to account for these
t rends include: (1) decline in the real value of income transfers (tends to
i n c rease relative female official povert y, but has no effect on NEC
p o v e rty); (2) increase in the labor force participation of women (tends to
d e c rease relative female official povert y, but has no effect on NEC
p o v e rty); (3) increase in female wage rates and decrease in male wage rates
( d e c reases female poverty and increases male poverty under both off i c i a l
and NEC definitions); and (4) increase in male joblessness (increases male
o fficial poverty rates, but has no effect on NEC poverty) (see Juhn 1992).
We would speculate that the “gender twist” in both poverty rates, but
especially in NEC poverty, is primarily the result of erosion in the quan-
tity of labor supplied by low-skilled males relative to females and the
absolute decrease in low-skilled male wage rates over this period.
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The low relative growth in the official and NEC poverty rates among
blacks and Hispanics appears to be primarily attributable to the rather
steady increase in absolute wage rates of minority workers and their re l a t i v e
wage rates (compared to white workers). Joblessness among low-skilled
workers has also increased somewhat more for whites than minority gro u p s ,
and this, too, has contributed to the “racial twist” in poverty tre n d s .
Rapid Increases in Poverty in Families Headed 
by a Low-Education Wo r k e r
For both poverty measures, but especially the NEC measure, larg e
absolute increases in poverty rates are re c o rded for families headed by
high school dropouts and high school graduates. The absolute fall in
wage rates earned by those with little education and few skills appears to
account for these increases. Because a falling low-skill wage rate
decreases actual earnings less than it decreases earnings capacity,21 the
negative impact of this erosion will be larger for the NEC poverty rate
for those with low education than for the official poverty rate.22
I n c reasing Overall Poverty Rates, Especially NEC Povert y
The main story that this analysis has revealed is the large increase in
p o v e rty defined as the inability to be self-reliant relative to off i c i a l
income povert y, which itself has tended to rise over time. Although
several of the factors that we have already mentioned contribute to
this disparate growth pattern, we speculate that the substantial
i n c rease in wage inequality “within” age-race-schooling groups over
the period is primarily responsible for this development. This rise in
wage inequality serves to increase both the official and the NEC
p o v e rty rates, as it pulls those at the bottom of the wage distribution
f u rther away from the constant (in real terms) poverty line. Because
the relative deterioration of wages at the bottom of the distribution
weights all of the potential work hours of the low-wage population in
the estimation of NEC povert y, but only the hours actually worked in
the estimation of official povert y, the impact of this growth in wage
inequality will be greater for NEC than official povert y. We attribute
the large absolute and relative increase in the overall NEC povert y
rate to this factor, together with the absolute decreases in wage rates
of males and less-educated workers.
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To summarize, a new way to measure the population of the poor in the
United States might be to look at which families lack the capabilities
n e c e s s a ry to earn, through their own eff o rts, an income sufficient to
have an accepted, minimum living standard. Such a measure may be of
m o re interest to policymakers who emphasize self-reliance (and by
extension, a smaller role for government) in society than is the current
measure. We have shown that the level of poverty in the United States,
as measured by this alternative indicator, has increased substantially
over the past two decades. There is a growing population of Americans
who would remain below official poverty thresholds, even if they were to
use their full capabilities.
We must stress that this measure is not intended as a replacement for
the current official measure of povert y, but as a supplement to it.
C e rt a i n l y, the official measure identifies an important segment of the
population, namely, families that lack sufficient money income to meet
a minimum living standard. As such, it is well-suited to identifying fami-
lies in need of short - t e rm monetary assistance. Our measure is better
suited to identifying families in need of longer- t e rm skill-enhancing
assistance. Like a measure of “health povert y,” which would identify
individuals with the worst health, or a measure of “housing povert y, ”
which would identify individuals with insufficient housing, our earnings 
capacity measure identifies those individuals with insufficient skills and
abilities to generate minimally acceptable earnings levels.
The rapid growth in this type of poverty is discouraging for a society that
prides itself on being one in which individuals are able to prosper and
thrive by working hard and playing by the rules. The message that work-
ers and their families must rely on their own resources appears to have
come at a time when changes in basic demographic and economic
t rends have made it more difficult for those with few skills and little
human capital to make it on their own. In particular, we noted the sub-
stantial increase in NEC poverty among our least-educated individuals
and speculated that the decline in wage rates for this group was primarily
responsible. Explanations for the decline in wages include changes in
technology, which increased the demand for highly skilled and educated
Net Earnings Capacity versus Income for Measuring Povert y
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tend to be lower-skilled workers.23
This decline in earnings capacity highlights the dilemma faced by self-
reliance advocates. If income support measures are ruled out as eroding
work eff o rt, encouraging dependence, and fostering the growth of
income poverty, what policy measures are available to reduce the preva-
lence of those who are unable to be self-reliant? Essentially, there are
only two general policy strategies available: (1) increase the level of edu-
cation, training, skills, and other income-generating characteristics of
those at the bottom of the human capital distribution and (2) increase
the “return” that individuals with low earnings capacity receive on the
use of their human capital.
The first approach suggests designing and increasing re s o u rces devoted to
p rograms to improve schools and to provide training services for those
with few skills and little human capital. Programs similar to Head Start
could increase the value of early education. Direct financial aid for post-
s e c o n d a ry school could stimulate later human capital investments.
Teaching the skills needed in the “high technology” economy could
develop human capital furt h e r. An evaluation of these and other pro-
grams is beyond the scope of this brief, but these are the types of pro g r a m s
that will be needed if self-reliance is the nation’s policy goal. How best to
design and implement such programs and to ensure that they are cost-
e ffective becomes a question of major import a n c e .
The second approach is the more controversial, as it directly calls into
question the productivity returns reflected in market-determined wages.
Policy measures capable of reducing NEC poverty through increasing the
re t u rns to market work of those with little human capital often carry
with them their own distortions and inefficiencies. Such measure s
include raising the national minimum wage, subsidizing wages for those
at the bottom of the wage distribution, and subsidizing the earnings of
those whose work is insufficient to move their families above the poverty
line (such as through the earned income tax cre d i t ) .2 4 The question
again is how to create effective and cost-effective measures.
Some may argue that we have examined the trends in earnings capacity,
but have ignored aspects of human capital accumulation and family 
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f o rmation involving choice. For example, should an individual whose
education ended with high school graduation be considered “human
capital poor” when he or she could have obtained a postsecondary
d e g ree? We would argue that while there are elements of choice in post-
s e c o n d a ry enrollment, those choices may be made with imperfect infor-
mation or under liquidity constraints. The individual considering
attending college in 1979 was making his or her decision at a time of
declining “college earnings premiums” and may have believed that a
college education was simply not worth the investment. Should that
individual be held responsible for subsequent changes in labor market
conditions? Do individuals who cannot aff o rd postsecondary school or
do not possess the ability to pursue a postsecondary education “decide”
not to attend or are they constrained from augmenting their human
capital stock? Similarly, some may argue that NEC poverty among sin-
gle mothers arises from decisions they make about family formation and
f e rt i l i t y. We would respond that, at some level, some kind of choice may
be involved, but quite often single motherh o od arises from abandon-
ment, divorce, and decisions made by fathers. Should these single-
mother families not be considered NEC poor because their expectations
of family formation proved incorre c t ?
R e g a rdless of whether human capital accumulation, family form a t i o n ,
and similar characteristics depend on choices or not, the fact re m a i n s
that certain families and individuals lack the ability to be self-re l i a n t ,
lack the ability to earn their way to minimum income thresholds. If self-
reliance and economic independence are to be the standards by which
we gauge our success as a nation, and if income maintenance is not a fea-
sible policy instrument, we cannot avoid the question of how to provide
those now not able to be self-reliant with the skills, capabilities, and
returns on their efforts they need. In the face of demographic and eco-
nomic trends that appear to be generating increases in the prevalence of
poverty as measured by net earnings capacity, finding an answer to this
question assumes greater urgency.
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1 . This approach to poverty measurement has been called the Leiden
a p p roach, as most of the re s e a rchers who have pursued it have spent some
time at Leiden University in the Netherlands. Bern a rd van Praag is the
central figure in this approach; the important papers are Hagenaars
(1986) and Hagenaars, van Praag, and van We e ren (1982). The Leiden
a p p roach involves construction of an indicator of well-being based on
income levels that individuals subjectively rate as “excellent,” “good,” etc.
2 . An excellent study of the origins of the official poverty measure and of
the analytical and empirical bases for it is Ruggles (1990). 
3.  C i t ro and Michael (1995) discuss a revision proposed by a National
Academy of Science panel. This revision is designed to reflect the con-
sumption “means” of a family relative to its needs better than the curre n t
m e a s u re does.
4 . One of the earliest proponents of this view was Charles Murray (1984).
His influential book Losing Gro u n d s t a rted a stream of writings, speeches,
and political candidacies asserting that government policy—especially
w e l f a re and other income-support measures—was the real problem, not
having a population of cash-short people.
5 . To emphasize that we are only interested in an indicator of an individual’s
capabilities, we could have called this measure “labor market potential” or
“earnings potential.” The indicator is not substantively different from mea-
suring the health status of an individual and then comparing it to some
defined minimum standard of health in order to identify the “health poor.”
6 . This discussion is based on a more technical paper that describes in detail
the pro c e d u res we use to estimate this “self-reliance” poverty measure and
the norms on which it is based. See Haveman and Bershadker (1998).
7 . In this pro c e d u re each individual with the same set of characteristics is
assigned the same earnings capacity, neglecting the role of unobserv e d
human capital, labor demand characteristics, and “luck” in the process by
which earnings are determined. As a result, the distribution of earn i n g s
capacities that we would obtain would be artificially compressed. To adjust
for this, we adopt a pro c e d u re that re s t o res the effect of these unobserv e d
factors. Te c h n i c a l l y, we apply a random shock reflecting the unexplained
variation in the re g ressions to the estimated value for each observ a t i o n .
Even though this pro c e d u re re q u i res a number of assumptions re g a rd i n g
the distribution of the unobserved factors, it is a reasonable way to secure a
distribution of earnings capacities that avoids artificial compression. See
Haveman and Bershadker (1998) for a more complete discussion of this
p ro c e d u re .
8 . This adjustment pro c e d u re relies on what people state when answering
questions about why they are not working full-time, full-year. The adjust-
ments are rough, but they do capture the effects of most characteristics of
health and employability that should be taken into account. Most likely,
the pro c e d u re results in an understatement of NEC povert y. For example,
it probably captures the reduced earnings only of the most seriously 
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disabled, not of those disabled who work but at reduced prod u c t i v i t y. It
does not take into account the effects of having a disabled child or of
being an alcoholic (when that condition is not re p o rted as a disability).
Because the pro c e d u re does not make a sufficient adjustment for people
with such characteristics, too high an earnings capacity may be attributed
to them. Again, see Haveman and Bershadker (1998). We make the
unemployability adjustment for all individuals who re p o rt not working
full-time, full-year, but do not make it for individuals who are never in the
labor force. Applying this adjustment to these individuals is impossible in
that they do not re p o rt the reasons why they are totally out of the labor
f o rce. Some would argue that we should make a similar adjustment for the
“discouraged worker.” Because of the difficulty of identifying discouraged
workers, we have not made such an adjustment. To this extent, our esti-
mate of earnings capacity is biased upward to some small degre e .
9 . We neglect the nonwage compensation that is paid to some workers, such
as health insurance and pension contributions.
1 0 . T h e re are clearly costs other than child care associated with full-capacity
work. These include transportation costs to and from work, work-related
clothing purchases, and food purchased away from home. We neglect these
required costs and take our estimates of the costs of adequate market pro-
vided child care to be a reasonable estimate of unavoidable work-re l a t e d
costs. We make the adjustment for child care because many people are
uncomfortable with the idea that being out of the labor force is voluntary in
the case of parents with preschool or school-age children.
1 1 . We begin with estimates of the weekly cost of child care for children age 0
to 5 ($90 per week in 1996) and 6 to 11 ($50 per week in 1996) (see U.S.
General Accounting Office 1997). We adjust these estimates for region of
the country, standard metropolitan statistical area status, and year (see
Casper 1995). We multiply the adjusted cost estimate by the number of
c h i l d ren in the family age 0 to 5 or 6 to 11 as appropriate and convert to
nominal dollars. For further details on this pro c e d u re, see Haveman and
Bershadker (1998). As an alternative to this pro c e d u re, we could attribute
an earnings capacity of zero to one parent or to t h e p a rent (in the case of
single parents) in families with young children and ignore re q u i red child
c a re costs. Quantitatively, this would make a diff e rence in our calculations
only to the extent that the d i ff e re n c e between the estimated earn i n g s
capacity for the parent and the child care expense is large enough to move
the family from a position below its poverty line to one above it.
F u rt h e rm o re, to the extent that the percentage of families so affected is
constant over time, such an adjustment would affect only the level and
not the trend in NEC povert y. Finally, note that we have built in a single
adjustment for child care, when in fact child care expenses are highly vari-
able. It would be possible to obtain information on this variance and then
make assignments as seem appropriate, but such a pro c e d u re would have
little effect on our overall estimate of the level or trend of NEC povert y.
1 2 . In calculating the NEC we ignore short - run constraints placed on a per-
s o n ’s earnings capacity by the demand-side of the labor market. Our indi-
vidual earnings capacities simply estimate what the individual c o u l d e a rn
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in the economy if he or she held a job paying a wage commensurate with
his or her observed human capital characteristics.
1 3 . Note that the official series in Figure 2 differs slightly from Figure 1
because the population in Figure 2 is restricted to individuals in house-
holds headed by a working-age person.
1 4 . See Johnson (1996) and U.S. General Accounting Office (1996) for a dis-
cussion of Slesnick’s poverty threshold calculations.
1 5 . Jencks and Mayer also re p o rt a separate calculation using consumption
e x p e n d i t u res rather than income and substituting for the official povert y
lines alternative measures (with alternative inflation adjustments) that
they judge to be more appropriate. While the official childre n ’s povert y
rate increases by 3.9 percentage points (from 14.3 percent to 18.2 perc e n t )
f rom 1972–1973 to 1988–1990, their consumption-based childre n ’s
p o v e rty rate falls by 0.9 percentage points. They find this pattern to be
consistent with that for their revised income poverty figure s .
1 6 . The two highest education groups were excluded from this listing even
though their percentage rates of growth were above average. It is diff i c u l t
to interpret the percentage increase calculation, given that the base level
is a very low number.
1 7 . Because the absolute size of these relatively mainstream groups is large re l-
ative to the population, the 82 percent increase in the overall NEC
p o v e rty rate (from 5.79 to 10.54) over the period is largely attributable to
the deterioration in their relative earnings capabilities.
1 8 . The official poverty rates of these groups at the end of the period ranged
f rom 26.05 percent to 57.37 percent, compared to the overall off i c i a l
p o v e rty rate of 13.72 perc e n t .
1 9 . The economic and demographic changes discussed have been documented
in numerous re s e a rch articles and are commonly described in news stories.
2 0 . “Male poverty” here refers to families headed by single men, with and
without children, and married couples, with and without children; “female
p o v e rty” here refers to families headed by single women, with and without
c h i l d re n .
2 1 . In the first case, the wage rate is multiplied by actual hours worked, which
is often rather low for low-skilled workers; in the second case, the wage
rate is multiplied by full-time, full-year work.
2 2 . The relative increase in wage rates for minorities, which also tend to have
relatively low levels of schooling, works to offset the effect of falling re l a-
tive low-skill, low-education wages.
2 3 . The decline in wage rates has been heavily re s e a rched in recent years. See
Levy and Murnane (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy
(1992), and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) for analyses of the changing
s t ru c t u re of wage rates over the 1970s and 1980s.
2 4 . For a discussion of such wage and employment subsidies as an antipovert y
s t r a t e g y, see Haveman (1988).
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